Key origin, custody, recovery and verification semantics.
availableAvailableReviewed 5 Sept 2026
Keys used for hardware-verified security are intended to be generated and protected in hardware-backed environments associated with the active form factor—card historically; SIM, eSIM or iSIM currently per company declaration. Exact generation location, custody model and export policy per deployment remain editorial tasks until engineering publishes confirmed details. This answer does not invent algorithms or key sizes.
unknownUnknownReviewed 5 Sept 2026
Organizational key control is a program design choice across enterprise, bank, government or telco custody models. Keyra documentation must state which models are supported, proposed or unavailable. Historical Cyber One workforce themes suggest enterprise relevance, but current supported custody options require confirmed product evidence before claiming full customer key control.
availableAvailableReviewed 5 Sept 2026
Compromise response should revoke or suspend affected credentials, rotate keys where supported, and re-enroll on a trustworthy form factor. Hardware-verified designs aim to contain software malware impact, but physical theft, insider misuse or flawed recovery can still create risk. Use only confirmed revocation channels.
availableAvailableReviewed 5 Sept 2026
Safe recovery re-establishes hardware-backed credentials under policy instead of accepting a weak software-only bypass. Lost-device recovery should preserve the hardware trust boundary through identity checks, invalidating old keys and enrolling a new SIM, eSIM, iSIM or card instance—exact steps are product-specific.
availableAvailableReviewed 5 Sept 2026
Changing form factor typically requires separate enrollment of hardware-protected keys rather than casually exporting private keys. Whether regeneration, controlled migration or dual enrollment is supported is deployment-specific and not asserted here without engineering confirmation. Export policy cells remain editorial_task in the hardware matrix.
availableAvailableReviewed 5 Sept 2026
A trust root or trust anchor is the reference material a verifier uses to validate cryptographic evidence from a client or device. Public Keyra technology messaging describes SIM as a trust-anchor theme. Operational trust-store management belongs to platform operators and application publisher configuration.
plannedPlannedReviewed 5 Sept 2026
Keyra Vault Certified is framed as a target architecture for validated end-to-end hardware-rooted authorization unless later approved evidence establishes otherwise. Keyra Connected is a proposed capability with alternative authorization paths and must not inherit full Vault assurance claims. Wallet or network connectivity does not equal Vault Certified status.
availableAvailableReviewed 5 Sept 2026
This knowledge center does not invent certifications. Historical CyberONE public materials reference FIDO-oriented themes; that is not proof of a current Keyra certification listing. Until an approved certificate register is published, assume no independent certification claim beyond documented company declarations and public corroboration cited on each answer.
availableAvailableReviewed 5 Sept 2026
No. Designing toward a standard or using standard vocabulary differs from holding an accredited certification for a specific product version and scope. Keyra answers may cite standards for education while keeping company declarations and independent assessments in separate provenance classes.
availableAvailableReviewed 5 Sept 2026
SIM-swap and subscription takeover risks matter for mobile identity. Hardware-verified security applications aim to raise the bar beyond SMS OTP, but recovery and operator processes still need hardening. Threat models should include device loss, insider misuse and flawed bypasses—without claiming systems are unhackable.
